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Indirect Mobilization:  The Social Consequences of  
Party Contacts in an Election Campaign 
 
 
 
 
Although direct contacts between campaigns and individuals are a central part of the process that 
encourages political participation, it is often argued that their effects extend beyond the initial 
contact via a secondary process of indirect mobilization.  This paper puts that argument to the test 
by investigating possible connections between direct party contacts and political mobilization in 
social networks.  The results show that the primary social consequence of party contacts is to alter 
the substance, but not the volume, of politically oriented conversations that occur in social 
networks.  These conversations in turn increase the salience of the campaign in the electorate but 
have only a mild effect on levels of campaign involvement.  Although political mobilization does 
influence social communication, its effect on political involvement is restricted to socially based 
forms of involvement under limited conditions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 A great many Americans would agree – if asked – that citizens should participate in 
electoral politics.  Nevertheless participation in campaigns is hardly widespread, in large part 
because many people are not sufficiently motivated to become involved.  Consequently the 
efforts of political parties and candidates to mobilize voters, presumably by providing 
information about a campaign’s dynamics or specific reasons for involvement, are a particularly 
important cause of political participation.  Along these lines, considerable attention is given to 
explaining when and how political mobilization successfully spurs involvement.  At the 
individual level of analysis, such efforts often examine how the behavior of citizens who have 
been directly contacted during a campaign differs from the behavior citizens who are not 
similarly exposed.  But since these contacts are limited in number, discussion of their impact 
often refers to their cascading effects.  The conceptual implication of such discussions is that 
political mobilization is a two-stage process.  In the first stage, political parties or campaigns 
contact voters through a variety of methods in an attempt to garner people’s support.  In the 
second stage, labeled indirect mobilization by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the information 
transferred in the first stage cascades through social networks, thereby affecting a broader cross-
section of the electorate and magnifying the influence of party mobilization.   
Though there is substantial evidence that traditional forms of partisan mobilization and 
contact increase participation (Gosnell 1972; Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b; Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993), there has been next to no research on how social networks amplify, or potentially 
mute, the party contacting effect (but see Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993, Chapter 5).  Additionally, research that examines social network effects on involvement 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; McClurg forthcoming; Mutz 2002; Leighley 1990; Knoke 1990; 
Kenny 1992; Verba et al. 1995) does not directly examine the overlap with elite-driven 
mobilization.  Thus important questions about the mobilization process have gone largely 
unaddressed including such fundamental issues as whether diffusion occurs, how it occurs, and 
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how strongly it affects political participation.  Therefore, we cannot adequately understand how 
broadly political mobilization reaches into the electorate and how much participation it 
stimulates.   
In this paper I outline and test hypotheses about the operation and effect of indirect 
political mobilization.  Using self-reported partisan contacts to measure direct political 
mobilization, I first examine whether people who are contacted during elections report different 
patterns of social communication.  I then turn my attention toward the participatory consequences 
of indirect mobilization, asking whether it leads to greater involvement in electoral politics.  
Drawing on survey data specifically gathered to study the influence of social interaction on 
political behavior, the empirical evidence shows that party mobilization stimulates an efficacious 
process of indirect mobilization in social networks.  However, the findings also show that indirect 
mobilization is limited in both the breadth and strength of its effect. 
PARTISAN MOBILIZATION AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION 
 The Concept of Political Mobilization.  Much work on political participation focuses on 
the individual determinants of action such as socioeconomic status (Verba and Nie 1972; 
Milbrath and Goel 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), personal civic resources (Verba et al. 
1995), or innate interest (Verba and Nie 1972).  In wake of this research, it became clear that 1) 
political factors had a minimal role in scholarly explanations of involvement and 2) individual 
determinants of action had limited explanatory power in empirical models.  Accordingly, more 
attention was given to factors broadly grouped together under the rubric of political mobilization. 
According to Rosenstone and Hansen’s comprehensive study of mobilization, this 
concept is defined as “the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce other 
people to participate” (1993, p. 25).  A somewhat broader, but similar, definition is provided by 
Leighley who writes that “mobilization…is a response to contextual cues and political 
opportunities structured by the individual’s environment” (1995, p. 188).  In both instances, the 
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key idea is that regular citizens become more likely to participate when exposed to external 
political stimuli. 
These definitions describe a broad set of factors that potentially influence participation, 
not all of which are central to this paper.  Following Rosenstone and Hansen I restrict the concept 
in two ways for the analysis this paper.  First, their empirical treatment of mobilization 
distinguishes among concrete contacts between people and the influence of broader 
environmental as stimuli toward political involvement.  Although there is evidence that 
environmental cues affect individual participation (e.g., Cox and Munger 1989), these factors 
operate differently than  the individualized contacts that occur via leaflets, phone calls, the party 
canvass, and similar activities (e.g., Gosnell 1927; Gerber and Green 2000a, 200b; Rosenstone 
and Hansen 1993; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994).  Second, Rosenstone and Hansen’s 
theoretical discussion implies that participation is affected by two types of individualized 
contacts.  Direct mobilization refers to interaction between political elite and voters that 
stimulates involvement, via such mechanisms as telephone banks and door-to-door canvassing.  
This can be distinguished from indirect mobilization where people who have been contacted by a 
party similarly motivate participation of other voters in their social circle. 
This second distinction is central to this paper.  While conceptually distinct, these two 
processes are discussed as though they overlap empirically.  Specifically the belief is that partisan 
contacts (direct mobilization) activate the second-order social process where people are indirectly 
exposed to mobilization through social networks (indirect mobilization).  For instance Rosenstone 
and Hansen write, 
The impact of political mobilization…extends far beyond the effect it has on the limited 
number of people who are contacted directly….Social networks, that is, converts direct 
mobilization into indirect mobilization.  Political leaders mobilize citizens for political 
action through social networks (1993, p. 27). 
Similarly Richard Fenno writes that, 
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No matter how a congressman allocates, presents, or explains, he reaches a relatively few 
people directly.  Offsetting this situation, House members believe that as a result of their 
direct contacts with as many supportive constituents as they can reach, they will also 
reach a great many more people indirectly.  They are strong  believers in the two-step 
flow of communication….Their belief is that though they may not reach as many people 
as they would like, those they do reach…will talk to others about them (1978, p. 237). 
Thus, the belief is that party contacts diffuse through social networks in a manner similar to the 
two-step flow of communications described by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) and the contextual 
diffusion model illustrated by Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992, 1995).   
 Studies of Political Mobilization.  Starting with Harold Gosnell’s (1927) voter turnout 
study, a great deal of evidence demonstrates the efficacy of direct mobilization for explaining 
participation.  Using a basic quasi-experimental design Gosnell found that turnout could be 
stimulated by something as innocuous as a brochure explaining how to register.  Other field 
experiments demonstrate similar effects for people with little interest in (Eldersveld and Dodge 
1954) or information about (Eldersveld 1956) local elections.  More recently, Gerber and Green 
(2000a, 2000b) show that many (but not all) forms of direct contact (e.g., personal canvassing 
versus telephone contact) positively influence participation.  Through a series of non-
experimental studies, still other evidence suggests that real-life partisan contacting efforts 
produce similar results (Katz and Eldersveld 1961; Cutright 1963; Cutright and Rossi 1958a, 
1958b; Bochel and Denver 1971, 1972; Cain and McCue 1985; Kramer 1970-1971; Price and 
Lupfer 1973; Lupfer and Price 1972; see Blydenburgh 1971 for an exception). 
 Rosenstone and Hansen further advance the literature by arguing that the contact effect 
exists for activities other than voter turnout.  Relying on voter’s self-reported contacts by political 
parties in the National Election Study from 1956 to 1988, they estimate that being contacted by a 
political party increased the probability of voting by 10.4-percent, of trying to persuade others 
how to vote by 11.8-percent, of doing campaign work by 4.8-percent, and of donating money by 
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6.7-percent.  The only variables in their study with comparable effects were personal education 
and the perceived closeness of the election. 
 Viewed as a whole these findings support the notion that direct mobilization stimulates 
political involvement for an array of electoral activities but say next to nothing about the process 
of indirect mobilization.  Although there is some survey-based research linking reported levels of 
formal (Leighley 1996; Pollock 1982; Verba et al. 1995) and informal (Leighley 1990; Knoke 
1990; Kenny 1992; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; McClurg forthcoming) social involvement to 
electoral participation, these treatments do not explicitly investigate the link between direct and 
indirect mobilization.  Accordingly, we have no evidence that party contacts cascade through 
social networks and thereby generate a wide-reaching process of political mobilization.  This has 
important consequences both for the state of our knowledge regarding political mobilization and 
our understanding of electoral outcomes.  From a scholarly perspective, the lack of evidence on 
the overlap between elite mobilization and social mobilization means we do not have a clear 
understanding of either 1) the role of social networks in explaining involvement or 2) the impact 
of campaigns on individual participation.  In short, our models of political behavior are based on 
incomplete evidence.  But our lack of knowledge also calls into question how important get-out-
the-vote efforts and similar campaign activities are in elections.. 
To start addressing this gap in the empirical literature, the next section outlines 
hypotheses about the connection between direct contacts and mobilization via social networks.  
Using self-reported partisan contacts as a lens through which to view direct mobilization, two 
specific issues are addressed.  First, when and how do party contacts affect social interaction in 
interpersonal networks?  Second, do social interactions stimulated by party contacts indirectly 
mobilize electoral involvement? 
The Party Canvass and Indirect Mobilization.  One possible way that party contacts 
affect indirect mobilization is to influence the exchange of political information within social 
networks (informational contagion).  Empirically, this means that people who have been 
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contacted by a political party during a campaign should exhibit different patterns of political 
conversation with people in their social network when compared to people who have not been 
contacted (Burt 1990).  This type of effect could manifest itself in two ways.  First, party contacts 
may increase the exchange of political information in social networks either by leading people to 
discuss politics more frequently or to expand their politically-oriented network (the volume 
hypothesis).  This type of change in social interaction would relate to participation, and thus 
indirect mobilization, by virtue of the fact that such conversations affect individual participation 
(Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; McClurg forthcoming).  Contacts may also change how people talk 
about politics with their network partners (the content hypothesis).  If convinced by the appeals 
contained in party contacts, people who have been contacted may themselves try to mobilize 
other voters.  In other words, a contacted citizen is presumed to mimic the party contact by 
specifically asking people to support specific candidates and become involved on that candidate’s 
behalf (hereafter called interpersonal persuasion) 
A second way that party contacts might stimulate indirect mobilization relies not on 
altered patterns of social communication, but on the behavior of the person initially exposed to 
the contact (behavioral contagion).  If party contacts encourage participation of the person who is 
initially contacted, that change in behavior can activate social norms supporting electoral 
involvement and thus increase the probability a person’s associates participate.  Even if the 
contacted individual does not talk about politics more or explicitly mobilize her friends and 
neighbors, they can still influence their behavior by participating themselves and setting an 
example of good citizenship or signaling the importance of the campaign to friends and family. 
Though this second possibility might seem unintuitive at first glance it has substantive 
appeal when carefully considered.  In some friendship and family situations politics (along with 
religion) may be considered a taboo subject, regardless of party contact.  People who are 
contacted may not necessarily alter their conversational patterns due to conventions that limit 
political discussion.  Yet the simple act of putting up a yard sign or working on a campaign can 
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still signal what is appropriate political behavior to one’s family and friends.  This may be 
especially true in social networks, where an individual’s participation can suggest to network 
members how “people like me” should behave with respect to elections.  Buttressing this notion 
is Kenny’s (1992) demonstration that people who have friends that participate in politics are 
themselves more likely to participate, even after accounting for simultaneous influence.  In this 
scenario, we would then expect that a person’s acquaintances are more likely to be involved if the 
party contact successfully mobilizes that person (behavioral contagion hypothesis). 
In sum, this discussion identifies two links and three hypotheses between party contacts 
and indirect mobilization in social networks.  Each of these is visually depicted in Diagram 1.  In 
this schematic, the circles represent two citizens who share a common social tie, one of whom has 
been contacted by a political party. Each hypothesis is represented by a series of arrows and text 
boxes describing how indirect mobilization would follow the party contact.  The largest rectangle 
represents pathways that require for altered patterns of social communication to occur for indirect 
mobilization to proceed, while the other text box represents the link that revolves around altered 
behavior of the contacted citizen.  The remainder of this paper empirically investigates these 
possibilities. 
[Diagram 1 about here] 
DATA 
To properly address these questions, it is necessary to have data on party contacts, the 
characteristics of individuals, social communication, and the behavior of the people in the 
individual’s interpersonal network.  In this paper, I use survey data from the South Bend Study, 
which was conducted during the 1984 presidential campaign (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1985).  The 
South Bend Study is appropriate for examining the questions addressed here because it was 
designed to examine the relationship between social networks and political behavior.  It includes 
interviews with an initial sample of registered voters (hereafter respondents) who were selected 
via a stratified sample in seventeen neighborhoods from South Bend, Indiana as well as 
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interviews with a sample of people who were named as political discussants (hereafter 
discussants) by the respondents. 
 Two subsets of the South Bend interviews are used in the analysis that follows.  The first 
subset is a pre- and post-election panel of respondents.  These data are used to analyze the 
relationship between party contacts and social interaction.  Although the South Bend study was 
designed as a three stage panel study (two pre-election and one post-election waves), I draw only 
from the information gathered from participants in the second and third waves.  In this subset 
there is a temporal gap between the stimulus of interest (party contacts) and a potential response 
(social interaction) thereby allowing for a better causal inference about these two variables.  At 
the same time, using the second pre-election survey minimizes the effects of panel attrition and 
respondent recall error while simultaneously maximizing sample size. 
The second subset of data is comprised of discussion dyads and it is used to study the 
consequences of social discussions influenced by party contacts.  This subset was constructed by 
pairing each respondent with one of his or her discussants.  With these discussion dyads, I can 
examine the effect of respondent behavior on discussant participation and accordingly judge the 
behavioral impact of party-stimulated social mobilization.  We can, in other words, link both 
party contacts and patterns of communication directly to the behavior of the discussants with 
these two subsets of data. 
PARTISAN CONTACTS AND DISCUSSION EFFECTS 
The Volume of Political Discussion.  It has been shown that social networks encourage 
higher levels of political involvement when they provide political stimuli to the participants (Lake 
and Huckfeldt 1998; McClurg forthcoming).  Much less clear is whether the frequency of 
political exchange in social networks – one potential form of indirect mobilization – is related to 
direct attempts at political mobilization.  In this section, I investigate the volume hypothesis by 
analyzing the impact of party contacts on the amount of political discussion that occurs between 
respondents and the people in their social networks.i 
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The dependent variable is measured using a survey question in which each respondent 
reported on the frequency of political discussion with their network associates.  For each network 
discussant,ii a respondent could report never discussing politics, talking politics once in a while, 
sometimes, or fairly often.iii  Although respondent’s perceptions may be biased by their own 
interest in politics or poor re-call, these distinctions provide analytic leverage for distinguishing 
among networks with a little and a lot of political interaction. 
To measure direct mobilization, I use a party contacting variable in which respondents 
could report partisan contacts aimed at influencing his or her vote choices in the up-coming 
election.  While respondents were asked a variant of this question in all three election waves, the 
second pre-election measure is employed in the analysis in this section in order to be consistent 
with the logic of causality and to maximize sample size.  This variable is coded so respondents 
were either contacted by someone (coded “1”) or not (coded “0”).   Although this measure is 
widely employed in the field (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), it is important to point out that 
that it underestimates the number and type of contacts people are exposed to and has the distinct 
disadvantage of not recording what activity the respondent was asked to do (Abramson and 
Claggett 2001).  Keeping this limitation in mind, the results below only apply to the limited 
number of partisan contacts people are exposed to while potentially understating the effect of 
specific requests on similar requests in social networks. 
Using Huckfeldt’s (2001) model of political discussion to guide model specification, a 
host of motivational and social factors thought to stimulate political discussion are included in the 
empirical models reported below.  To capture the effect of motivation and sophistication on 
discussion I include measures of campaign attentiveness, partisan extremity, and respondent 
education.  Four measures of networks characteristics are also included.  Two of these – whether 
the discussant is a spouse or relative rather than a friend – measure social intimacy between the 
respondent and each discussant.  Another measure is the respondent’s perception of the 
discussants political knowledge, a variable which Huckfeldt shows is strongly related to levels of 
-11- 
political discussion in networks.  Finally, a dichotomous measure of perceived political 
agreement (i.e., whether the respondent’s partisanship matched his or her perception of the 
discussant’s partisanship) is included.  If party contacting stimulates political discussion, the 
inclusion of these variables will rule out a number of alternative social and motivational 
interpretations and focus attention primarily on the consequences of party contact on network 
political interaction.iv 
 Three sets of ordered probit estimates are presented in Table 1.  Each model represents 
the effect of the independent variables on the amount of political discussion between a respondent 
and one of his or her network discussants.  Overall, the results show that political conversation 
changes primarily as a function of individual characteristics and the features of the discussion 
dyad, but not as a result of direct mobilization.  Not only is the measure of partisan contacting 
statistically insignificant but is negative as well, providing no support for the volume hypothesis.v 
[Table 1 about here] 
This null finding has significant ramifications for our understanding of political 
mobilization.  It is often argued that both political factors (like party contacts) and social factors 
(like conversation in social networks) can make participation more likely.  Such arguments often 
imply that the primary role of social factors is to extend the influence of political mobilization 
rather than to independently influence participation.  Yet this conventional wisdom is not 
supported by these findings and they highlight the possibility that social networks influence 
participation separate from the role given to them in the discussion of indirect mobilization.  
More practically, mobilization efforts by election campaigns likely do not have quite the reach 
that many people believe they do because they do not create political conversations where they do 
not already exist. 
The Content of Political Discussion.  Although party contacts do not stimulate political 
exchange in social networks beyond what already exists, that does not imply that those exchanges 
are less important in the wake of a party contact.  Along these lines, I now turn my attention to 
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the second discussion-based hypothesis: do party contacts spur indirect mobilization by changing 
the content of political discussion in social networks?  My hypothesis states that party contacts 
make people more likely to persuade people in their network to support a specific side in an 
election (and potentially how to show that support).   
For this part of the analysis, the dependent variable is a question on the second pre-
election survey instrument that asked whether or not each respondent recalled trying to persuade 
others how to vote.  Though this measure is limited in a number of ways, the most pressing issue 
is that it assumes that attempts at interpersonal persuasion occur in social networks.  While this is 
a reasonable possibility, the indirect link between the phenomenon of interest (persuasion in a 
network) and the measure (persuasion in general) means that there is some additional uncertainty 
associated with the results of this analysis beyond that captured by the statistical estimates.  
Nevertheless, the survey question captures a behavior that is central to the content hypothesis and 
it is reasonable to believe that attempts at interpersonal persuasion are unlikely to occur with 
complete strangers except under specific circumstances.  In addition to the variable measuring 
party contact, I include controls for a respondent’s social status, strength of partisanship, and 
interest in the election in the estimates that follow.  The effect of these variables on interpersonal 
persuasion is reported in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Whereas contacts had no discernible effect on the frequency of political conversation, 
they do have a statistically significant and positive effect on the likelihood of trying to influence 
the voting behavior of others.  Simply put, people who are contacted are more likely to engage in 
interpersonal mobilization, evidence that is consistent with the content hypothesis.  Additionally, 
the results show that people who are more educated, more interested in the campaign, and 
stronger partisans are more likely to try convincing others how to act and whom to support.   
Since the probability of each variable is contingent on the value of all the other 
independent variables in probit models, the effect of partisan contacts is estimated for a 
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hypothetical South Bend resident who was somewhat interested in the campaign, a “weak” 
partisan, currently employed, made between twenty and thirty thousand dollars, and average in all 
other regards.  Using an algorithm developed by King et al. (2000; see also Tomz et al. 1998 and 
Appendix B), I produce a distribution of probabilities that this individual tried persuading others 
how to vote depending on whether he or she was contacted by a party during the campaign.vi  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 The left-hand curve in Figure 1 displays the probability distribution for a person who was 
not contacted during the campaign; the right-hand curve is the distribution for the same 
hypothetical person who had been exposed to partisan contact.  The distinct modes in the curves 
visually depicts the strong and positive effect of party contact on the probability of engaging in 
interpersonal mobilization.  The mean of the left-hand distribution is .27, indicating that the 
probability this individual mobilized others was reasonably low.  Moreover, the 95-percent 
credible interval for this distribution has an upper boundary of just .32, indicating that that at best 
only 3 in 10 hypothetical respondents attempted to mobilize others if not contacted by a party.  
The mean of the right-hand distribution is .42 with a lower credible interval boundary of .34.  
This shows that the consequence of party contact is to increase the average probability of 
mobilizing others by fifteen percent.  Moreover, the lack of overlap between the credible intervals 
for both distributions lends considerable support to the confidence with which we can conclude 
that party contacting stimulates interpersonal mobilization.  The worst case scenario is that party 
contacting increases the probability interpersonal persuasion by a modest 3-percent.  But even 
after accounting for all sources of uncertainty with the “average” increase is a more robust fifteen 
percent with the best case (for the content hypothesis) being nearly twenty-seven percent.  these 
are even strong effects than those reported by Rosenstone and Hansen. 
Thus far, the evidence is consistent with the content hypothesis and we cannot reject the 
argument that party contacts affect the substance of information exchanged in these networks.  
While interpersonal political discussions are not stimulated by party contacts, people who are 
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contacted by a political party are more likely to engage in attempts at persuasion.  This in turn 
implies that the mobilizing potential of network exchanges may shift in the wake of a party 
contact, at least creating the possibility for efficacious indirect mobilization.  But several 
questions remain.   
First, we do not know for certain that the respondent’s persuasive attempts were aimed at 
people in their social networks.  For instance, a person who is contacted by a political party could 
become mobilized to do campaign work and, as a part of that involvement, become an active 
participant in a canvass or telephone bank where they are trying to persuade strangers rather than 
friends.  In analyses not shown here, this possibility was examined by re-estimating the model in 
Table 2 for those respondents who did not work on a campaign.  Even after eliminating campaign 
workers from the sample, people who were contacted by a party were much more likely to engage 
in political persuasion (β=0.46, p<.001).  This leaves open the possibility that party contacts 
stimulate persuasion with people that respondents bring into their networks (a possibility I cannot 
test), though the fact that party contacts do not affect discussion is inconsistent with this 
possibility. 
Second, the results in Table 2 and Figure 1 may mask heterogeneity among individuals.  
Common sense suggests that strong partisans react differently a party contact than do 
independents or undecided voters.  Indeed, the content of a party contact may not even be the 
same for both types of voters.  This logic is one of the reasons why parties try targeting their 
contacting efforts towards certain voters, though such targeting meets with limited success.vii  To 
examine this, I reproduced the simulations illustrated in Figure 1 for strong partisans and 
independents separately.  Consistent with the aforementioned logic, stronger partisans are more 
likely to attempt persuading others than are leaners or independents.  Yet the differences are not a 
substantively strong as we might expect.  Among independents, party contacts increase the 
average probability of interpersonal persuasion by 13-percent as compared to an increase of 16-
percent among strong partisans. 
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 All in all, the results provide insight into the possibility that party contacts stimulate 
informational contagion in social networks.  Although the evidence above does not support the 
possibility that direct mobilization increases the volume of information exchanged in networks, it 
implies that the substance of that information changes.  Equally as important, this effect occurs 
for people who are not mobilized to become campaign participants and for independents and 
strong partisans alike.  One implication of this is that campaigns are partly less effective at 
mobilizing participation than in the past because the social networks are smaller and less 
politically-oriented than they once were (e.g., Putnam 2000).  Another implication is that 
campaigns do not currently stimulate more interactions, so that they must either contact more 
people or alter their contacts in such a way to stimulate broader exchange if they want to focus on 
mobilizing voters.   
INDIRECT MOBILIZATION AND ELECTORAL ENGAGEMENT 
 In light of these results, the next issue is whether party contacts indirectly increase 
electoral awareness and engagement.  There are two possibilities consistent with the arguments 
and evidence discussed thus far.  First, discussants exposed to respondents that attempted to 
persuade others are more likely to become engaged in the election campaign than discussants who 
are not similarly exposed.  This hypothesis is a natural extension of the analysis above.  The 
second possibility does not rely on altered patterns of communication per se, but still allows for 
the possibility of indirect mobilization as a consequence of party contacts.  A behavioral 
contagion effect implies that party contact indirectly stimulates participation by changing the 
behavior of the person originally contacted, with a likely explanation being that respondents who 
have been contacted are more likely to participate and that their family or friends participate at 
the same time, in the same activities.  Such an argument fits well with Huckfeldt’s (1979) finding 
that socially-based activities are susceptible to contextual influences while individually-based 
activities are not.  This implies that we should only observe this effect for activities in which 
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multiple people can participate simultaneously, such as attending a campaign rally or working on 
a campaign – a refinement of the behavioral contagion argument.  
To examine these hypotheses, I use five different measures of discussant political 
engagement as dependent variables from the dyad data.  The first dependent variable is a measure 
of cognitive engagement, based on a survey question that asked discussants to report how 
interested they had been in the campaign.  Discussants were allowed to report that they were not 
too interested, somewhat interested, or very interested.  Additionally, four survey questions 
measuring involvement in each of the following campaign activities were also used:  putting up a 
sign or displaying a bumper sticker; working for a candidate or party; attending a rally; or 
donating money to a party or candidate. viii  Each discussant was distinguished by whether or not 
he or she reported participating in the activity (coded “1”) or not (coded “0”).     
To test for the effects related to the content hypothesis on the discussant’s political 
involvement, I measure interpersonal persuasion with the dependent variable analyzed in Table 2.  
Empirically estimating the behavioral contagion hypotheses is somewhat trickier since people 
who are active may also be more likely to be contacted, meaning that the indirect effect of a party 
contact might overlap with that of a respondent’s underlying propensity to participate.  Since the 
two processes overlap so much that a multiequation model is near-impossible to identify, I mimic 
an empirical strategy similar to that employed by Abramson and Claggett (2001):  the indirect 
effect of party contacts are accounted for by including the measure of whether the respondent was 
contacted by a political party during the campaign which served as the independent variable in 
the previous section.  Drawing on official voting information, I simultaneously control for the 
respondent’s general predisposition toward political activity by measuring how many of the four 
previous general elections he or she voted in.ix  This controls for the “typical” level of 
sociopolitical pressure that the respondent’s behavior applies to the discussant, thus establishing a 
baseline against which the effects of 1) interpersonal persuasion [which is stimulated by party 
contacts] and 2) a respondent’s party contacts exert on the discussant’s level of participation.x  
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Incorporating both the respondent contact and persuasion variables as predictors of discussant 
political involvement is biased against finding evidence on behalf of either hypothesis because 
they should exert a strong affect on discussant behavior while being correlated with social 
interaction. 
In addition to the variables discussed above, I include measures discussant partisanship, 
education, income, age, and union membership on political engagement to control for individual 
factors that predict involvement.  The measure of political discussion between the respondent and 
discussant examined as a dependent variable in Table 1 is also introduced to control for distinct 
processes of social mobilization that are unrelated to those stimulated by party contact.xi  
Unfortunately, data limitations make it impossible to include a measure of whether a discussant 
was exposed to the process of direct mobilization.  Accordingly, we must remain open to the 
possibility that the effects of some variables may be due to the unmeasured effects a campaign 
contacts experienced by discussants.  However, inclusion of the control variables still provides 
for a fairly broadly specified model of political participation that will shed some light on the 
impact of indirect mobilization.  Table 3 reports the results of each model.   
[Table 3 about here] 
Consistent with previous work, we see that electoral interest and strength of partisan 
identification are statistically significant predictors for each form of political engagement.  The 
amount of political discussion in the network influences three forms of engagement (attention to 
the election, campaign work, and display of campaign signs), while education, income, and age 
also influence some subset of the dependent variables.  While confirming old hypotheses about 
the individual sources of participation, these findings also reiterate the fact that the amount of 
political discussion in social networks predicts participation.  They also are consistent with 
Huckfeldt’s (1979) finding that some activities are more susceptible to social influence than 
others, though it is unclear whether this same distinction applies to mobilization more generally.  
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Importantly, the model specification ensures that this effect is over and above the effects of social 
discussion stimulated by party contacts. 
More central to this paper are the results regarding indirect mobilization.  Here there is 
clear evidence that people who are exposed to indirect mobilization via social networks are more 
likely to become involved, though the effect is somewhat less consistent and milder than is 
typically assumed.  With respect to the content hypothesis, a main respondent’s willingness to 
engage in interpersonal persuasion has a statistically discernible effect on the discussant’s 
attention to the election but not the discussant’s likelihood of engaging in any of the four overt 
campaign activities.  That iscussants who are exposed to a respondent’s persuasive attempts do 
not engage in more costly forms of electoral participation implies that the socially-filtered party 
message does not carry the same weight and force as conveyed in the original contact.   
Figure 2 displays the substantive effect of informational contagion on the discussant’s 
attentiveness to the campaign, the only measure that is significantly influenced by this process.  
The curves in Panel A and Panel B show that discussed exposed to mobilizing respondents had 
slightly lower probabilities of being not very or somewhat interested in the campaign.  Panel C, 
on the other hand, shows a strong effect on being very interested in the campaign.  The average 
probability of a person who did not know a respondent that attempted to influence the votes of 
others was very interested in the campaign is 34-percent, while a similar person exhibits a 
probability of nearly 44-percent when exposed to such a mobilization attempt.  This ten point 
shift represents a substantial increase in the likelihood of campaign interest.  However, the 
simulations show that there is relatively high statistical uncertainty associated with this effect.  
The upper boundary for the 95-percent credible interval on the left hand curve is 46-percent, 
compared to 33-percent lower boundary for the other curve.  So while discussant cognitive 
engagement is empirically affected by interpersonal persuasion, the substantive effect is not very 
large or without a measure of uncertainty. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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Stronger evidence exists on behalf of the behavioral contagion hypothesis.  Discussants 
who know a contacted respondent are more likely to work on a campaign and attend meetings or 
rallies.  While recognizing that the specification is imperfect but useable, controlling for the 
respondent’s participatory history implies that the results reflect the indirect effect of party 
contacts and not the respondent’s underlying disposition toward political involvement.  Finally, 
the absence of a statistically reliable influence on the other forms of activity, each of which can 
be characterized as individual modes of involvement, again highlights the limited reach of 
indirect mobilization. 
 Figure 3 displays the substantive impact of knowing a respondent that was contacted by a 
political party on campaign work and meeting attendance while controlling for different levels of 
campaign interest.  The effect of knowing a contacted respondent is weak for respondents who 
report being uninterested in the campaign and then increases for more interested respondents.  For 
example, a discussant who knows a contacted respondent increases the average probability of 
campaign work from .2-percent to .7-percent for discussants who were not too interested in the 
campaign (upper left-hand graph).  While this represents a large factor change, the probability of 
participation remains quite low.  A similar result occurs for the attendance variable among 
uninterested respondents, where intepersonal persuasion increases the probability from 1.5-
percent to a 3.8-percent.  In contrast, the effect of party contacts is substantively much stronger 
among the very interested respondents displayed in the second row of Figure 3.  Among these 
discussants the probability of working on a campaign nearly doubles going from 6.6-percent to 
13-percent, while the probability of attending a meeting increases from 23-percent to 36-percent. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 These figures again show that there is a relatively high level of uncertainty associated 
with these results.  As mentioned, discussants who know respondents that were contacted by a 
political party always have a higher mean probability of participation than discussants who were 
not similarly exposed to indirect mobilization.  However, there is notable overlap in the 95-
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percent credible intervals for the curves in all four panels of Figure 3.  Not only does this mean 
that we have notable uncertainty about the substantive strength of the behavioral contagion effect, 
but it is further evidence that effects of indirect mobilization are limited in their scope. 
 The results show that even while party contacts do filter through social networks they 
only affect a subset of discussant political activities and with substantive effects that are 
contingent on levels of campaign interest.  When combined with the results in the preceding 
section, we must conclude that indirect mobilization is not nearly as widespread and strong as the 
conventional wisdom implies.  Party contacts can reach beyond the point of initial contact but 
only under a set of circumstances that are now relatively clear: 1) the initial contact must reach a 
person embedded in a network that is already politically-oriented, 2) the strongest substantive 
effect will be to increase interest in the campaign, and 3) the possibility that people who do 
become interested will participate is limited to socially-oriented activities and only then when 
they have become cognitively engaged in the campaign.   
Not surprisingly, this picture implies that the process of indirect mobilization conveys 
party messages to more people than campaigns contact themselves.  Rather than amplifying the 
message, the effect is limited in both the number of people it reaches and the types of activities it 
influences.  This directly contrasts the received wisdom on this matter.  Yet despite these 
qualifications, it would be inappropriate to suggest that indirect mobilization is unimportant.  For 
example, the increased probability of campaign work for knowing a respondent who has been 
contacted by a party is approximately 7-percent for a discussant who is very interested in a 
campaign.  To put this in the context of research on direct mobilization, party contacts (direct 
mobilization) themselves increase the probability of participation by only 5-percent (Rosenstone 
and Hansen 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
Many accounts of political mobilization make claims about the existence and importance 
of a two-step process without much evidence linking direct mobilization to the politics in social 
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networks.  The main contribution of this paper is unpacking the complex theoretical relationship 
between the process of elite (or political) mobilization and social mobilization and then 
examining the implications with data.  The evidence shows that party contacts stimulate some 
indirect mobilization in social networks, though the behavioral impact of that process is 
somewhat limited.  This supports the conventional wisdom that indirect mobilization can be 
stimulated by campaign behavior, while simultaneously showing that the effect of direct contacts 
is narrower and weaker than assumed.  Partly this is because party contacts do not stimulate 
additional political discussion and partly because the effects of indirect mobilization only exist 
under specific conditions.  This means that arguments about the importance of indirect 
mobilization are partly right and partly wrong – while the process exists and it undoubtedly 
influences levels of activity, it is not as widespread or as significant as some would have us 
believe. 
The results also confront an implied assumption in the field of political behavior, namely 
that social networks do not have an independent effect on participation.  It is often argued that 
social network effects are primarily the result of 1) a general psychological disposition toward 
politics that also predicts participation or 2) a process of contagion where social networks are 
important only as a pipeline from the campaign to the public.  Given the well-documented 
relationship between mobilization and political participation, the lack of evidence for the volume 
hypothesis calls the first view into question and implies that politically-oriented social interaction 
should be placed elsewhere in the taxonomy of political behaviors.  This is further supported by 
the positive relationship between participation and indicators of both political discussion and 
indirect mobilization after controlling for a respondent’s participatory history.  Moreover, the 
finding that political discussion in the social network influences participation after controlling for 
indirect mobilization suggests networks exert an additional pull on participatory behavior that 
does not come simply from a campaign-stimulated process.  In short, this is further – though still 
incomplete – evidence that social networks independently influence participation.  Practically 
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speaking, this means that models of political involvement must therefore account for both 
political and social mobilization processes in order to be properly specified   
Most importantly, these findings have important practical and normative implications.  
Although party contacts are an important precursor to participation, this form of campaigning is 
falling out of favor as campaigns make better use of media outlets as their main tactical tool.  And 
since these contacts do not stimulate additional political discussion, we also have no evidence that 
they play a role in expanding the politically-relevant social networks.  As a consequence, the 
aggregate impact of party contacts on participation is smaller than perhaps many believe and 
shows no sign of increasing under the conditions identified in this analysis.  But on the positive 
side, these findings suggest that social networks do not rely upon party contacts in order to 
influence levels of political participation.  Given the persistence of politically-oriented social 
interaction – even in the face of a decline of social interaction (Putnam 2000) – the social 
foundations of campaign engagement may be stronger than perhaps we believe. 
For a variety of reasons, this paper is only the initial word on these issues.  The results 
only examine one manner by which party contacts spur social mobilization – party contacts.  It 
may very well be true that more common modes of campaign communication observed in 
campaigns today stimulate more discussions and information transfers with stronger effects (e.g., 
Popkin 1994, p. 45-50).  Notable campaign events like the Willie Horton ad in the 1988 election 
or the second presidential debate in 2000 might be more worthy of water cooler conversation than 
the messages conveyed in the traditional party canvass.  The analyses here also rely strongly on 
self-reports regarding campaign contacts, political communication in networks, and participation.  
These relatively rough measures, and the non-experimental nature of the analyses, also suggest 
that much exploration is left to be done.   
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Diagram 1.  The Potential Social Consequences of Party Contacts.  This figure shows 
three ways that party contacts may influence the participatory behavior of people via 
social networks.  Each text box describes how interaction between Citizen A and Citizen 
B might influence the behavior of Citizen B.  The large square represents links that rely 
on altered patterns of social communications.  Arrows from Citizen A to the text box 
represent the manner by which Citizen A’s party contact might be translated in a manner 
that it influences Citizen B.  Arrows from each text box to Citizen B suggests that the 
pathway influences his or her propensity to participate in politics.  Solid arrows represent 
links verified by empirical research; dashed arrows represent hypothesized links.   
 
 
 
 
 
Citizen A 
Increased level of 
politically-relevant 
conversation (volume 
hypothesis) 
Altered content of 
politically-relevant 
conversation (content 
hypothesis) 
Political involvement by 
contacted citizen 
(behavioral contaggion 
hypothesis) 
Citizen B 
Political Party, 
Candidate, or 
Campaign 
Behavioral Contagion 
Informational Contagion 
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Table 1.  Effect of Party Contact on Levels of Political Discussion, Ordered Probit Models. 
 
Variables 
 
First Discussant Named 
 
Second Discussant 
Named 
Third Discussant 
Named 
 
Party contact 
 
 
Campaign attentiveness 
 
 
Strength of partisan 
identification 
 
Years of education 
 
 
Perception of discussant’s 
knowledge 
 
Spouse 
 
 
Other relative 
 
 
Perceived partisan  
agreement 
 
 
    -0.08 
   (-0.84)a  
 
     0.51*** 
    (6.16) 
 
     0.09** 
    (2.47) 
 
     0.04** 
    (2.74) 
 
     0.51*** 
    (8.09) 
 
     0.13 
    (1.57) 
 
     0.05 
    (0.51) 
 
    -0.04 
   (-0.58) 
 
    -0.02 
   (-0.24) 
 
     0.43*** 
    (5.01) 
 
    -0.02 
    (0.05) 
 
     0.02 
    (1.07) 
 
     0.50*** 
    (7.90) 
 
     0.43*** 
    (3.15) 
 
    -0.03 
   (-0.33) 
 
     0.13 
    (1.65) 
 
    -0.01 
   (-0.11) 
 
     0.38*** 
    (4.43) 
 
    -0.01 
    (2.56) 
 
     0.04** 
    (2.34) 
 
     0.49*** 
    (7.62) 
 
     0.28* 
    (1.87) 
 
     0.04 
    (0.44) 
 
     0.20 
    (2.55) 
 
Threshold #1 
 
 
Threshold #2 
 
 
Threshold #3 
 
 
 
    -0.26 
(s=0.23) 
 
     2.14 
(s=0.24) 
 
     3.29 
(s=0.25) 
 
    -0.75 
(s=0.24) 
 
     1.79 
(s=0.25) 
 
     2.76 
(s=0.25) 
 
    -0.42 
(s=0.25) 
 
     2.18 
(s=0.26) 
 
     3.11 
(s=0.26) 
 
Likelihood χ2 
N 
Log Likelihood 
 
 
  161.72 
1060 
 -971.09 
 
  115.13 
1030 
-877.32 
 
  108.34 
1005 
-825.04 
a
 Values in parentheses are Z-scores. 
*p<.10, two-tailed test  
**p<.05, two-tailed test 
***p<.01, two tailed test 
Dependent Variable:  “When you talk to [NAME OF DISCUSSANT], how often do you talk about 
politics?”
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Table 2.  Effect of Party Contacting on Attempts to Persuade Others How to Vote, Probit Model. 
 
Variables Interpersonal Persuasion 
Model    
  
 
 
Party contact 
 
 
Interest in election 
 
 
Strength of partisanship 
 
 
Currently working 
 
 
Income (in categories) 
 
 
Years of Education 
 
 
Age 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
     0.42*** 
    (4.23)a  
 
     0.89*** 
    (8.78) 
 
     0.14*** 
    (3.35) 
 
     0.12 
    (1.21) 
 
     0.01 
    (0.54) 
 
     0.06*** 
    (2.90) 
 
    -0.01*** 
   (-6.58) 
 
    -2.15 
   (-6.58) 
 
 
      
     
 
      
     
 
     
  
 
      
     
 
     
  
 
Likelihood χ2  
N 
Log Likelihood 
 
 
  167.32 
1319 
 -632.00 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
a
 Values in parentheses are Z-scores. 
*p<.10, two-tailed test  
**p<.05, two-tailed test 
***p<.01, two tailed test 
 
Dependent Variable:  “So far this year, have you talked to anyone and tried to show them why they should 
support one of the candidates for president?” 
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Table 3.  The Effect of Respondent Persuasion and Knowing a Contacted Respondent on Discussant 
Political Involvement.  
 
Variables 
 
Attention to 
Election 
(Ordered 
Probit) 
 
Work on 
Campaign 
(Probit Model) 
Attend 
Meeting or 
Rally (Probit 
Model) 
 
Display Sign 
or Bumper 
Sticker (Probit 
Model) 
Donate 
Money to a 
Party or 
Candidate 
(Probit 
Model) 
 
 
Main Respondent 
Mobilized Others 
 
Main Respondent 
Contacted by 
Party 
 
Attentiveness to 
the Election 
 
Strength of 
partisan 
identification 
 
Political 
Discussion with 
Main Respondent 
 
Years of education 
 
 
Income (in 
categories) 
 
Age 
 
 
Member of  
union household 
 
Respondents 
Participatory 
History 
 
 
     0.26** 
    (2.43)a 
 
    -0.07 
   (-0.54) 
 
 
     ----- 
 
 
     0.24*** 
    (3.53) 
 
 
     0.24*** 
    (3.13) 
 
 
     0.09*** 
    (3.89) 
 
     0.04 
    (1.55) 
 
     0.02*** 
    (5.24) 
 
     0.16 
    (1.50) 
 
    -0.02 
   (-0.63) 
 
    -0.12 
   (-0.74) 
 
     0.38** 
    (2.15) 
 
 
     0.70*** 
    (4.91) 
 
     0.32*** 
    (4.03) 
 
 
     0.33*** 
    (3.26) 
 
 
     0.05 
    (1.38) 
 
     0.01 
    (0.12) 
 
     0.002 
    (0.56) 
 
     0.16 
    (1.04) 
 
     0.002 
    (0.06) 
 
    -0.12 
   (-0.90) 
 
     0.38** 
    (2.46) 
 
 
     0.73*** 
    (6.38) 
 
     0.22*** 
    (3.45) 
 
 
     0.13 
    (1.38) 
 
 
     0.07** 
    (2.37) 
 
     0.10*** 
    (2.57) 
 
     0.01* 
    (1.80) 
 
    -0.05 
   (-0.36) 
 
     0.11** 
    (2.99) 
 
     0.05 
    (0.37) 
 
    -0.06 
   (-0.39) 
 
 
     0.50*** 
    (5.32) 
 
     0.26*** 
    (4.43) 
 
 
     0.15* 
    (1.73) 
 
 
     0.05* 
    (1.78) 
 
     0.01 
    (0.24) 
 
     0.01 
    (1.57) 
 
     0.01** 
    (2.45) 
 
     0.03 
    (1.02) 
 
     0.08 
    (0.58) 
 
     0.001 
    (0.01) 
 
 
     0.45*** 
    (4.75) 
 
     0.29*** 
    (4.72) 
 
 
     0.13 
    (1.51) 
 
 
     0.08*** 
    (2.66) 
 
     0.19*** 
    (5.33) 
 
     0.02*** 
    (3.96) 
 
    -0.20 
   (-1.56) 
 
    -0.01 
   (-0.42) 
 
Constant b 
 
 
Threshold #1  
 
 
Threshold #2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     1.77 
(s=0.39)c  
 
     2.92 
(s=0.40) 
 
    -4.40 
   (-6.64) 
 
    -4.75 
   (-8.27) 
 
    -3.39 
   (-6.68) 
 
    -4.77 
   (-9.09) 
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Likelihood χ2 
N 
Log Likelihood 
 
 
    79.81*** 
  672 
-603.43 
 
    85.48*** 
  672 
-214.31 
 
 129.13*** 
 672 
-290.98 
 
   88.83*** 
 672 
-343.05 
 
 144.06*** 
 669 
-333.47 
a
 Values in parentheses are Z-scores. 
b
 Parameter is an ordered probit threshold.  Constant is for the probit model. 
c
 The “s” stands for the standard error associated with thresholds in the ordered probit model. 
*p<.10, two-tailed test  
**p<.05, two-tailed test 
***p<.01, two tailed test 
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Figure 1.  The effect of party contacts on the probability of a main respondent engages in 
interpersonal mobilization.  
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Figure 2.  The effect of respondent interpersonal mobilization on a discussant’s cognitive 
engagement.  
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Figure 3.  The effect of political party contact of a respondent on a discussant’s likelihood of 
engaging in campaign work or attending a meeting, allowing for changes in discussant campaign 
interest. 
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APPENDIX A:  VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
The South Bend Study 
 
These data were collected by Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague.  The survey was designed as a panel 
study with a snowball component.  There were three waves in which data was gathered on the main 
respondents, who are analyzed in this paper.  Two of the survey waves took place prior to the 1984 
election.  A third wave was administered soon after the election.  There was replacement for observations 
that dropped out of the survey at each wave.  The variables measuring income, education, and age were 
administered to main respondents during the survey wave in which they entered.  The measures of political 
activity, number of discussants, and party mobilization were all administered in the post-election wave.  
The remainder of this appendix describes each of these variables and reproduces the original question used 
to gather the data. 
I. Political Variables – Main Respondents 
Mobilized Others 
This is a measure of whether or not a main respondent explicitly tried to get people to vote for one 
candidate or another.  These data were gathered in Wave B. 
“So far this year, have you talked to anyone and tried to show them why they should support one of the 
candidates for president?” 
(0) No     (1) Yes 
 
Partisan Contact 
This question was used to measure whether or not a main respondent had been contacted by a political 
party or candidate during the campaign.  This question was asked in Wave B of the survey. 
Has anyone called you up or come around and talked to you about supporting a candidate for president?                  
(0) No     (1) Yes 
 
Worked on Campaign 
Part of the analysis relies on controlling for campaign participation.  The following question, asked in 
Wave C, was used for this purpose. 
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“How about you?  Did you work for any candidate in this election?                                                        
(0) No     (1) Yes 
 
Interest in Politics 
Main respondents’ electoral interest was measured with a question about the whether or not they were 
paying attention to the campaign.  This was asked in Wave B. 
“Some people don't pay much attention to campaigns.  How about you?  Would you say that you were very 
much interested in following the political campaigns this year?” 
(0) No     (1) Yes 
Strength of Party Identification 
The measure of partisanship on the South Bend survey comes from two questions, both of which are the 
common measures.  The first asks the respondent to say whether he or she identifies with a party.  The 
second asks the respondent whether he/she leans towards are party or whether his/her identification was 
strong or weak.  The measure used in this paper was created by folding the common seven point scale to 
produce a measure of how strong each respondent’s partisan orientations are.  The coding is listed below. 
(0) Independent/Non-partisan  (1) Partisan leaner  (2) Weak partisan 
(3) Strong partisan 
 
II. Social Variables – Main Respondents 
Years of Education 
This is a straightforward question about how many years the main respondent had been educated.  The 
survey question is provided below.  Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A. 
“What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?” 
 
Income 
This variable measures each respondent’s income level by categories.  The survey question is listed below.  
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A. 
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“Last year, before taxes, was your total family income (response categories read): 
(1) Under $5000    (2) $5000 - $10,000  (3) $10,000 - $15,000 
(4) $15,000 - $20,000   (5) $20,000 - $30,000  (6) $30,000 - $40,000 
(7) $40,000 - $50,000   (8) $50,000 and over.” 
 
Age 
Each respondent was asked what year he or she was born in.  The age variable was coded by subtracting 
that number from 1984.  The survey question is listed below.  Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 
A. 
“In what year were you born?” 
 
Union Membership 
This variable measures whether someone in each main respondent’s household belonged to union. 
“Does anyone in your household belong to a labor union?” 
 
Church Attendance 
Each main respondent was asked how frequently he or she attended church. 
“Would you say you go to church/synagogue every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few 
times a year or never?”  
(0) Never    (1) A few times a year  (2) Once or twice a year 
(3) Almost every week   (4) Every week 
 
Currently Employed 
This is a straightforward question about whether the main respondent was employed at the time of the 
survey.  The survey question is provided below. 
“We'd like to know if you are working now, or are you unemployed, retired, keeping house, a student, or 
what?” 
Currently Married 
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This is a straightforward question about whether the main respondent was married at the time of the survey.  
The survey question is provided below. 
“What is your present marital status?” 
 
Active in Group 
Nearly every respondent in the South Bend survey reported being a member of some group.  Accordingly, 
the analyses in this paper use a measure of active membership in the following groups – fraternal/lodge, 
service/civic, veterans’, sport, youth, school service, hobby, school fraternity/sorority, ethnic, literary, 
professional, neighborhood, charity, or country club.  The general question wording is provided below and 
was asked in Wave B.  The active group variable was created by summing together these responses and re-
coding anything greater than or equal to one with a “1”.  The result is a dichotomous measure. 
“Now we would like to know something about the groups and organizations to which you belong.  Here is 
a list of various kinds of organizations.  Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of any of 
these, and if you are active as a member?                                                     
First, fraternal groups or lodges.  Do you belong to any? (If so: Are you active?) “ 
(0) Does not belong / belongs but  not active (1) Belongs and is active  
 
III. DYAD VARIABLES 
Talk Politics with Discussant 
This question is used to measure political discussion between a main respondent and a named discussant.  
This question was asked in Wave C.   
“When you talk with <first name of discussant>, about how often do you discuss politics?” 
(0) Never  (1) Only Once in a While (2) Fairly Often  (3) Most times 
 
Discussant Order 
This is variable is provided by the investigators.  It simply records the order in which each discussant is 
named, thereby providing a measure of the discussant’s saliency to the respondent. 
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Relationship Between R and D 
This variable measures how the respondent reported knowing each of his/her discussants. The questions 
used to gather this information is listed below.  This information was re-coded as a trichotomous variable.  
The highest category was for non-relatives, the middle category for relatives other than spouses, and the 
lowest category for spouses. 
“Is <first name of discussant> a member of your family?  (I mean, is <first name of discussant> related to 
you in any way – by marriage or blood?)” 
(1) Not related    (2) Spouse   (3) Mother or Father 
(4) Brother or sister   (5) In-laws   (6) Son or Daughter 
(7) Other blood relative  
 
“(If not related:) How did you get to know <first name of discussant>?” 
(1) Work    (2) Church   (3) Neighborhood 
(4) Family    (5) Republican Party  (6) Democratic Party 
(7) Other organization   (10) Politics   (11) School 
(12) Children in school together  (13) Friend of family  (14) Casual social sit.  
 
IV. Discussant Variables 
Social and Political Variables 
The question wording for the discussant variables was the same as for the main respondent variables.  All 
of the questions were posed after the election and the main respondent survey was complete. 
 
Campaign Interest 
This variable measures the level of interest each discussant reported having in the election campaign. 
“Some people don’t pay much attention to campaigns.  How interested were you in following the political 
campaigns this past year?” 
(0) Not too interested   (1) Somewhat interested  (3) Very interested 
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Political Action 
These variables measure each discussant's participation in the following activities:  working on a campaign, 
attending a meeting or rally, putting up a political sign or bumper sticker, or donating money to a party or 
candidate.  The questions used to gather the information are listed below. 
 “Did you work for any candidate in this election?” 
(1) Yes     (0) No 
 
“Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that?” 
(1) Yes     (0) No 
 
“Did you put up a political yard sign or bumper sticker during the campaign?” 
(1) Yes     (0) No 
 
“Did you give any money to a political party or candidate?” 
(1) Yes     (0) No 
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Table A-1.  Descriptive Statistics for Main Respondents. 
 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard Min  Max  N 
     Deviation 
 
 
Mobilized others  0.23   0.42   0   1  1504 
 
Partisan contact  0.19   0.39   0   1  1503 
 
Campaign work  0.07   0.26   0   1  1509 
 
Attention to   0.65   0.48   0   1  1498 
campaign 
 
Strength of   1.88   1.02   0   3  2124 
partisanship  
 
Strength of   1.80   0.87   0   3  1858 
ideology 
 
Years of   12.99   2.52   2  17  2150 
Education 
 
Income   4.54   1.95   1   8  1931 
 
Age   50.30  15.66  18  98  2129 
 
Union    0.25   0.43   0   1  2144 
 
Church attendance  2.55   1.43   0   4  2051 
 
Employed   0.58   0.49   0   1  2155 
 
Married   0.73   0.44   0   1  2149 
 
Active in group  0.72   0.45   0   1  1495 
 
 
Source:  1984 South Bend Election Study (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1985). 
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Table A-2.  Descriptive Statistics for Discussants. 
 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard Min  Max  N 
     Deviation 
 
 
Campaign work  0.13   0.34   0   1  924 
 
Attended rally  0.21   0.41   0   1   924 
 
Put up sign   0.26   0.44   0   1  924 
or sticker 
 
Donated money  0.29   0.45   0   1   919 
 
Followed   1.40   0.70   0   2  923 
campaign 
 
Strength of   2.02   1.00   0   3  908 
partisanship  
 
Strength of   1.89   0.84   0   3  848 
ideology 
 
Years of   13.41   2.40   0  17  923 
Education 
 
Income   4.99   1.83   1   8  838 
 
Age   48.21  15.12  14  90  921 
 
Employed   0.68   0.47   0   1  922 
 
Married   0.81   0.39   0   1  923 
 
 
Source:  1984 South Bend Election Study (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1985). 
Table A-3.  Descriptive Statistics for Dyad Variables. 
 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Stand. Min  Max  N 
     Deviation 
 
 
Relationship 0.74  0.89  0  2  924 
 
Talk Politics 1.33  0.66  0  3  923 
 
 
Source:  1984 South Bend Election Study (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1985). 
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APPENDIX B:  INTERPRETING STATISTICAL RESULTS WITH STATISTICAL SIMULATION 
Description 
This appendix describes a method for interpreting statistical results developed by Gary King, Michael 
Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg (2000).  In addition to developing this method, the authors have provided 
software (CLARIFY) for implementing it in STATA (Tomz et al. 1998).   
 
Method 
King et al. (2000) argue that there are two types of uncertainty in statistical results.  One of these types is 
fundamental uncertainty.  This form of uncertainty is accounted for in statistical results with the stochastic 
components of models.  A second form, labeled estimation uncertainty, refers to the fact that we have 
imperfect knowledge about population parameters.  In other words, the point estimates that come from 
statistical procedures are draws from a distribution around the true population parameter.  The problem, 
according to King and his co-authors, is that interpretation rarely accounts for this latter form of 
uncertainty. 
In order to rectify this problem, King et al. (2000) suggest using a simulation method to incorporate 
estimation uncertainty into substantive interpretation. This method assumes that the vector of parameter 
estimates in a statistical model, β*, are a draw from a normal distribution around the true population 
parameter, β.  The algorithm proceeds as follows:   
1. Record parameter estimates from a statistical model; 
2. To incorporate estimation uncertainty, draw a value from the distribution of $ to 
represent a parameter estimate; 
3. Choose values for the independent variables at which you will compute an 
expected value of the dependent variable; 
-44- 
4. Using the simulated coefficients from step 2 and using a draw from the model’s 
stochastic distribution, simulate an expected value of the dependent value for the set 
levels of the independent variables. 
 
By repeating each of these steps M number of times, it is possible to produce a distribution of expected 
values for the chosen levels of the independent variables that incorporates both types of uncertainty into the 
interpretation.  Comparing the expected value distributions for different values of the independent variables 
allows us to see the substantive impact of these variables.  In particular, graphical display of these expected 
value distributions can clearly depict these relationships (Cleveland 1993). 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
i
 It is possible that party contacts also lead people to increase the size of their politically-oriented networks 
by talking about politics to more people in their network.  Unfortunately, the limited number of discussant 
names collected in these data make it impossible to test this possibility. 
ii
 Respondents were asked questions about up to three different discussants.  Discussant interviews, which 
are used later in the paper, were conducted with only a sample of these named discussants.   
iii
 These responses numerically range from 0 (never) to 3 (fairly often).   See Appendix A for coding details. 
iv
 This statement is contingent on two assumptions.  The first is that party contacts effects are not 
contingent on the nature of the network.  Support for this can be seen in the quasi-experimental literature 
which implies the existence of an effect under highly controlled circumstances.  Admittedly, this does not 
account for possible heterogeneity.  The second assumption is that discussants themselves may be 
contacted and that those contacts are correlated with respondent contacts.  There is little evidence on how 
recruitment and social networks overlap (but see Verba et al. 1995).  If these assumptions do not hold, the 
effect of party contacts on indirect mobilization will be overestimated and thus should be kept in mind as 
interpretation of the results proceeds. 
v
 Considering the weight attached to the social consequences of party contacts, I explored the matter more 
deeply by conducting additional analyses with party contacting measures from the first pre-election and the 
post election waves.  Substituting these measures into the models does not change the results and hence the 
interpretation.  The lone exception was for the party contact measure from the first pre-election wave, 
where party contacting has is a positive and significant of discussion with the first discussant.  However 
that result should be treated skeptically because both panel attrition and repeated measurement effects 
could play a stronger role for this subset of data (Campbell and Stanley 1963). 
vi
 The advantage of King et al.’s methodology is twofold.  First, it incorporates information from both the 
systematic and stochastic portions of the empirical model.  Second, in doing so, the results provide 
information beyond point estimates and thus more accurately reflect our level of statistical uncertainty.  For 
more information see King et al. (2000), Tomz et al. (1998), and Appendix B to this paper. 
vii
 In South Bend, both parties are handcuffed by the Democratic party’s dominance of local elections.  Put 
simply, many self-identified Independents and Republicans register in the Democratic party in order to cast 
meaningful ballots in local races that are for all intents and purposes contested in the Democratic primary.  
This means that both the Republican and Democratic parties have incomplete lists of supporters and 
detractors when they use the primary election ballot information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992).  
viii
 Conspicuously absent from this list is a measure of voter turnout.  Although the survey instrument 
included a question about voter turnout, 91-percent of the discussant sample claimed to have voted.  This 
unlikely number would call into question any results and the analysis instead focuses on the more reliable 
measures. 
ix
 Unfortunately, I do not have access to the same information for discussants and still cannot measure their 
voter turnout. 
x
 I am grateful to Bob Huckfeldt for this suggestion. 
xi
 Even though party contacts do not stimulate higher levels of political conversation, those conversations 
do influence levels of political activity (McClurg forthcoming; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998).  Accordingly, it 
is important to control for its effects in order to accurately gauge the impact of party stimulated 
interpersonal mobilization on behavior. 
